Susanna Schellenberg specializes in epistemology and philosophy of mind. She is best known for her work on perceptual experience, evidence, capacities, mental content, and imagination. She is currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, where she holds a secondary appointment at the Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science. Her work has been published in journals such as Noûs, The Journal of Philosophy, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.



The Particular Elements of Perceptual Experience
Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? Schellenberg addresses this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. She argues that perceptual states are individuated by particulars and explore epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.

Time: 9:30 pm
Location: Ukrainian Institute of America / Concert Hall